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LAW AS INTERPRETATION
CHARLES W. COLLIER*
I. THEORY BETWEEN THE DISCIPLINES: THE HERMENEUTICS OF
"LAW AND"
A recent essay on Law, Literature, and the Problems of
Interdisciplinarity makes the following fairly uncontroversial yet
suggestive claim that
[t]he less anyone discusses what "law" is for purposes of comparing
law to literature, the easier it is to think of law in fairly stereotypical
terms drawn from the standard story about law's development as an
independent, nonhumanistic discipline.... [T]hat is, if practicing
law consists of the dry and technical manipulation of rules, then of
what relevance is literature (or anything else) to lawyers?1
The standard account of the development of law as an
independent or relatively autonomous discipline begins with the
efforts of Langdell to make the common law more scientific. I shall
have more to say about that standard account later, but for now
Baron's point remains a good one: if the boundaries of law-
understood as the relatively routine application of technical rules-
remain fixed and inevitable, then the prospects for expanding or
enriching law's horizons by means of law and literature (or "law and"
anything, for that matter) would be bleak indeed.
But of course the boundaries of law are not fixed or even
particularly resilient to reinterpretation. A vast temporal, cultural,
and social diversity is readily apparent among the recognizable legal
systems of the world. As Baron puts it,
I do not believe law has determinate boundaries that comparisons
with literature (or history or philosophy or economics) neutrally
discover. I believe that the definition of the field "law," like that of
any other field, will to some degree reflect or be a product of what
we, as a culture, want law to be and do.2
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Florida.
1. Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J.
1059, 1080, 1083 (1999).
2. Id. at 1085.
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In other words, law is "socially constructed."
The term (and the concept) "socially constructed" has come into
deserved disrepute in recent years, as it has come to mean almost
anything from "made up" to "invented" to "unreal." But, strictly
speaking, the claim that something is socially constructed means only
that it is a contingent product of historical events, social forces, and,
perhaps, ideology. Consider, for example, the so-called "Year 2000
Computer Bug," which, whatever else it may have done, will
doubtless be immortalized in lexicons of the future as "Y2K." The
Y2K problem was conventionally conceived of as a "technical defect"
of our computers, which might confuse the year 2000 with 1900 (or
not recognize it at all).3 Yet with all the discussion of the Y2K
problem, I have yet to hear a claim that our computers would do
anything other than precisely that which they had been specifically
designed and programmed to do (i.e., interpret our shortcut, two-digit
designations of the year as falling within the twentieth century). The
"problem" arises when the computers' blind adherence to their
preassigned tasks conflicts with a broad array of unanticipated social
uses to which the computer-generated data would now be put.
It is a real, but no less socially constructed, problem when a
computer-generated mortgage statement claims my payment is 100
years overdue. In many ways we could say of the Y2K problem what
has been said of gender: that it is "a social category whose definition
makes reference to a broad network of social relations, and.., is not
simply a matter of anatomical [read: technological] differences. ' 4 The
Y2K computer problem should really be understood as the late
twentieth-century social procrastination bug, or perhaps the
postmodern lack of imagination glitch.
Typically, a claim of social construction takes something like the
following form:
X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it
is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not
inevitable.5
In the case of law, we should readily recognize that its existence or
character is not determined by the nature of things, that its past or
3. See Rhonda Brammer, Life After Y2K, BARRON'S, Aug. 16, 1999, at 24.
4. Sally Haslanger, Ontology and Social Construction, 23 PHIL. Topics 127, 130 (1995); cf.
Rob Pegoraro, Y2K, From High Anxiety to Low Comedy, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2000, at El
("Instead of a computing problem and a technology issue, it became some sort of metaphor
about what kind of people we want to be, what sort of society we live in, and-a lot of the
time-how we all somehow deserved to be punished.").
5. IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 6 (1999).
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current states are not inevitable, and that it was "brought into
existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could
well have been different."6 We should almost certainly not say of law
what opponents of social construction have said about fundamental
physics: "If we ever discover intelligent creatures on some distant
planet and translate their scientific works, we will find that we and
they have discovered the same laws."'
Ian Hacking has shed great light on the discussion of social
construction by focusing on the question that forms the title of his
recent book: The Social Construction of What?8 In the realm of law,
we could point to our idea or concept of law, the historical
development of legal practices, their embodiment in established legal
principles and institutions, our current body of knowledge about the
legal world, and manifest signposts of law such as written
constitutions, statutes, regulations, orders, and judicial decisions-all
as deeply reflective of the specific mix of contingent social
circumstances and the circuitous route by which they somehow
arrived at their present incarnation. It is no objection to a traffic
patrolman's claim that I have exceeded the speed limit to point out
that, without our current, contingent mix of legal practices and
institutions, there would be no such thing as a speed limit at all. Our
law, and our laws, are no less real and objective for being socially
constructed, and even the traffic patrolman recognizes that.
I should like to focus attention on an aspect of law that is no less
socially constructed but is perhaps less well recognized. I call it the
"professional narrative." The professional narrative is a socially
constructed organization of legal knowledge into an authoritative
interpretation of law. The professional narrative is the body of
arguments and citations to authority that a successful advocate draws
upon in oral argument before the Supreme Court. It is an
interpretation of law that explains why, for example, the successful
advocate no longer cites Plessy v. Ferguson9 or Lochner v. New York 10
as authority.
In this Article, I shall trace out separate professional narratives
in common law, constitutional law, and in legal cases turning on the
distinction between community and society (Part III). But first I
6. Id. at 7.
7. Steven Weinberg, Sokal's Hoax, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 8, 1996, at 11, 14.
8. See HACKING, supra note 5.
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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should like to situate these legal-professional narratives within a
broader interdisciplinary framework (Part II).
II. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF HERMENEUTIC THEORY
The natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences all
make use of basic paradigms or conceptual frameworks in terms of
which apparently uninterpreted "results" can make sense. In none of
these disciplines are simple truths or uninterpreted results the
fundamental, elementary starting points of scientific or intellectual
discussion. As in law, the need for something like a professional
narrative pervades all intellectual disciplines.
A. The Book of Nature
The natural sciences are not usually thought of as interpretive
disciplines. But they make use of a powerful metaphor that can be
traced through antiquity (Plato), the early Christian period (Saint
Augustine), and the Renaissance: the Book of Nature. By the early
modern period it could be said that almost every modern natural
philosopher made reference to the Book of Nature.1 Galileo's
description in The Assayer (II Saggiatore) is perhaps the most famous:
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, which stands
continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood
unless one first learns to comprehend the language and read the
letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of
mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other
geometric figures without which it is humanly impossible to
understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about in
a dark labyrinth. 12
Today we would say that Galileo saw the need for an interpretive
framework within which his observations could make sense. On the
one hand, Galileo is arguing against what he terms "the firm belief
that in philosophizing one must support oneself upon the opinion of
some celebrated author,"'3 usually Aristotle or the Scholastic
commentaries and glosses on Aristotle's works. In this sense,
Galileo's criticism reflects one of the most widespread tendencies of
the early modern period: "What was said to be overwhelmingly
wrong with existing natural philosophical traditions was that they
11. STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 69 (1996).
12. See Excerpts from the Assayer, in DISCOVERIES AND OPINIONS OF GALILEO 229, 237-
38 (Stillman Drake trans., 1957) (1623).
13. Id. at 237.
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proceeded not from the evidence of natural reality but from human
textual authority."'" One is reminded in this context of the infamous
professor from Padua who refused to look through Galileo's
telescope (to see the newly discovered moons of Jupiter that
contradicted Aristotelian and Roman Catholic cosmology). Here the
emphasis is on studying the Book of Nature, as opposed to the
traditionally valued books of authoritative human authors.
On the other hand, Galileo is also insisting that nature is like a
book. It stands "open to our gaze"; but, like any book (and unlike
most other things that stand open to our gaze), it "cannot be
understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and
read the letters in which it is composed."15 The truths of nature are
not open to direct observation. To the untutored observer, the Moon
looks no bigger than a ball and the Sun appears to go around the
Earth. Even with a telescope, it is unclear whether the fixed stars are
very small or just very distant. "As a matter of fact both
interpretations fit the optical data equally well and a man of that
period had no scientific, but only philosophical, reasons for choosing
between them.' 1 6 The Book of Nature must be deciphered if it is to
make any sense.
In a later passage in The Assayer, Galileo suggests how that
decipherment might proceed. In explaining his theory of heat,
Galileo notes that many people believe heat is a real phenomenon,
property, or quality that actually resides in things that feel warm to
US.
Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal
substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded,
and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation
to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as
being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other
body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these
conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my
imagination. 17
But that such a substance should be "white or red, bitter or
sweet, noisy or silent, [or] of sweet or foul odor," continues Galileo,
"my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary
14. SHAPIN, supra note 11, at 68; cf. C.S. LEWIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 5, 11,189 (1964).
15. Excerpts from the Assayer, supra note 12, at 238.
16. ALEXANDRE KOYRt, FROM THE CLOSED WORLD TO THE INFINITE UNIVERSE 94
(1957).
17. Excerpts from the Assayer, supra note 12, at 274.
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accompaniments. ' 18  Without our senses' guidance, "reason or
imagination unaided would probably never arrive at qualities like
these."'19 From this Galileo concludes that tastes, odors, colors,
warmth, and the like are "no more than mere names so far as the
object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only
in the consciousness." 20 If the perceiving creature were removed, all
these qualities would cease to exist.
Galileo thus inverts the conceptual scheme established by
Aristotle in On the Soul, according to which (1) "perception of the
special objects of sense is never in error"; (2) while the perception
that there is, say, white before us cannot be false, "the perception that
what is white is this or that may be false"; (3) finally, with regard to
the universal attributes (e.g., movement and magnitude) of objects
having sensible qualities-"it is in respect of these that the greatest
amount of sense-illusion is possible."'21
Galileo inverts this traditional hierarchy by devaluing the direct
perceptions of things-as merely unique, subjective sensations that do
not admit of measurement or quantification. What he elevates to the
first rank is the scientific study of matter, as defined by universally
knowable mathematical and mechanical properties such as shape,
number, distance, motion, impact, etc. "When these properties are
not directly observable" - as they generally will not be-"the
physicist must search for them beneath the macroscopic appearances
that conceal them." 22
"Appearances that conceal"-this phrase is impossible in
Aristotle's doctrinal world, where direct perception is never in error.
A new role for the natural philosopher is suggested, that of
interpreting the appearances. In Husserl's formulation, Galileo is at
once "a discovering and a concealing genius." For if "[t]he
phenomena are only in the subjects... [i]f the intuited world of our
life is merely subjective," Husserl continues:
then all the truths of pre- and extrascientific life which have to do
with its factual being are deprived of value. They have meaning
only insofar as they, while themselves false, vaguely indicate an in-
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA 428b-429a.
22. PIETRO REDONDI, GALILEO HERETIC 57 (Raymond Rosenthal trans., 1987) (1983); cf.
EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY 53 (David Carr trans., 1970) (1954) ("[N]ature ... is in itself mathematical; it
is given in formulae, and it can be interpreted only in terms of the formulae.").
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itself which lies behind this world of possible experience and is
transcendent in respect to it.23
Thus it does not seem correct to say that, with Galileo's Book of
Nature, "[h]ere is the root idea of modern empiricism, the view that
proper knowledge is and ought to be derived from direct sense
experience." 24  That idea seems more descriptive of a different,
equally powerful metaphor: the mind as a Mirror of Nature. I shall
not duplicate Richard Rorty's exhaustive efforts to dismantle "[t]he
picture which holds traditional philosophy captive... that of the
mind as a great mirror, containing various representations-some
accurate, some not, 25 which in turn suggests the view of knowledge as
accuracy of representation. As Rorty notes, that original dominating
metaphor depends on "having our beliefs determined by being
brought face-to-face with the object of the belief (the geometrical
figure which proves the theorem, for example). ''26
By contrast, with the Book of Nature "[t]here were some
chapters... to which unaided experience drew attention in qualita-
tively illusory and misleading ways. Their decipherment, according to
Galileo, must be of a rational nature. ' 27 Interpreting the meaning of
the appearances implies two elements, not one. That to which one is
brought face-to-face is merely the perceptible signans of the Stoics; its
meaning is the intelligible signatum. Interpretation is a discursive
mental process for which the signans provides only the underlying
physical basis for something else.
According to Augustine, "[a] sign is a thing that brings
something else to mind, over and above the impression that the thing
itself makes on the senses. '28 This basic position is taken over by the
seventeenth-century logicians of Port-Royal and reformulated as
follows. Something can be both a thing and a sign at the same time.
When one regards an object solely in itself and in its own proper
being, the idea that one has of it is an idea of a thing; but when one
regards an object solely as representing another, the idea that one has
23. HUSSERL, supra note 22, at 54.
24. SHAPIN, supra note 11, at 69.
25. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 12 (1979).
26. Id. at 163.
27. REDONDI, supra note 22, at 55; cf id. at 53 ("We are in the seventeenth century, the
century of the gold of the Cabala, of exegesis, of ultrasophisticated systems of ciphers
concealing beneath irreproachable forms the most delicate diplomatic messages. Everyone
interprets, deciphers, makes up anagrams, and combines. It is the grand si&le of the
combinatorial and the linguistic.").
28. SAINT AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA lib. II, cap. I, at 1.
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of it is an idea of a sign, and this first object is termed a "sign."
Thus the sign comprises two ideas: the one of the thing that
represents, the other of the thing represented; and its nature
consists in prompting the second by the first.... [E]very sign
requires a distinction between the thing representing and the thing
represented.2 9
The relationship of the sign to its signification is not assured in
the order of things themselves; what connects them is "a bond
established, inside knowledge, between the idea of one thing and the
idea of another."'3 Beginning with the seventeenth century, there is
no more interest in searching for, discovering, or uncovering
preexisting signs; there is no longer any such thing as an unknown
sign-not because we are in possession of all possible signs, but
because
though God still uses signs to speak to us through nature, he makes
use of our knowledge, and the connections established between our
impressions, in order to institute in our minds a relationship of
signification. 31
B. The Bible As Literature
The Book of Nature was only one of the two books God had
written; the other was of course Holy Scripture, the Book of God.
"Holy Scripture is the word of God, which means that the Scripture
itself simply must have priority over the teachings of those who
interpret it. ' '32 Just as the direct reading of the Book of Nature called
into question the scientific authority of Aristotle and his scholastic
commentators, so the slogan "sola scriptura" undermined the
established interpretive authority of the Roman Catholic Church.
Yet even as Luther challenged the interpretive authority of the
Church in matters biblical, he also drew attention to the fact that the
29. ANTOINE ARNAULD & PIERRE NICOLE, LA LOGIQUE OU L'ART DE PENSER 52-53
(tdition critique par Pierre Clair et Franqois Girbal, 2d ed. 1981).
30. MICHEL FOUCAULT, LES MOTS ET LES CHOSEs 78 (1966).
31. Id. at 73; cf. GEORGE BERKELEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, reprinted
in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 413, 425 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds.,
1952) (1710) ("[Tlhe connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only
of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I
suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it."). See generally NOAM
CHOMSKY, CARTESIAN LINGUISTICS: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RATIONALIST
THOUGHT (1966); Charles W. Collier, Verzweiflung an der Geschichte, 52 DEUTSCHE
VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFr FUR LITERATURWISSENSCHAFr UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE 527 (1978).
32. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE 313 (3d erweiterte Auflage
1972); cf. 2 Timothy 3:16 ("All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for
instruction.").
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Bible must be interpreted by someone. The Book of God is a book in
an even more literal sense than the Book of Nature. The entire body
of Church doctrine, the accumulated dogmatic tradition of the
centuries-all this represented merely an established, entrenched,
and not particularly well-supported body of interpretation. "The
Romanists profess to be the only interpreters of Scripture," wrote
Luther, "even though they never learn anything in it their lives
long."33
They claim authority for themselves alone, juggle with words
shamelessly before our eyes, saying that the pope cannot err as to
the faith, whether he be bad or good; although they cannot quote a
single letter of Scripture to support their claim.... Therefore it is a
wicked, base invention, for which they cannot adduce a tittle of
evidence in support, to aver that it is the function of the pope alone
to interpret Scripture, or to confirm any particular interpretation. 34
But even for one committed to recovering or rediscovering the
Bible in its own terms, and not "as [it] had been mediated to the West
by the Church,"35 that project required interpretation, maybe even a
lot of interpretation. Luther certainly did his part in translating the
Bible into German and writing extensive commentaries on it (not to
mention a lifetime of teaching and preaching).36 The development of
the printing press did the rest. For the first time it became truly
possible to read the Bible for oneself.
The Bible, once free from the groaning weight of accumulated
Church commentaries and glosses, begins to resemble a language in a
linguistic community. Under normal conditions, where there is no
authoritative interpreter or arbiter, language leads "a semiological
life of its own."37  Language is the affair of everyone, hence the
property of no one. To an extent unparalleled in other social
institutions, everyone participates in language, and this is why it is
33. MARTIN LUTHER, An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality As to the
Amelioration of the State of Christendom, in MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM HIS
WRITINGS 403, 412 (John Dillenberger ed., 1961) (1520).
34. Id. at 412-13.
35. GABRIEL JOSIPOVICI, THE BOOK OF GOD: A RESPONSE TO THE BIBLE, at x (1988); cf.
MARTIN LUTHER, Preface to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, 1522, in MARTIN LUTHER:
SELECTIONS FROM His WRITINGS, supra note 33, at 19, 31 ("Often the text almost disappears
under the weight of the various marginal and interlinear glosses and commentaries; and one of
the key motives of the Reformers was to remove these glosses and allow readers to read the
Holy Book for themselves.").
36. See DIE BIBEL, NACH DER UBERSETZUNG MARTIN LUTHERS (revidierte Fassung
1984) (1534).
37. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 76 (Roy Harris trans.,
1993) (1916).
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constantly influenced by all. Only the collective is able to establish a
linguistic system, i.e., to institute values whose sole raison d'etre lies in
common usage and consent, and even it can do so only over time.
Introducing the newly translated (and widely printed) Bible into
the newly expanded "interpretive community" was like introducing
an artificial language into a natural linguistic community:
Anyone who invents an artificial language retains control of it only
as long as it is not in use. But as soon as it fulfils its purpose and
becomes the property of the community, it is no longer under
control.... Its transmission will follow laws which have nothing in
common with those of deliberate creation, and it will then be
impossible to turn the clock back.38
The comparison is instructive, because a further implication of
Luther's rejection of Church authority in biblical interpretation was a
corresponding broadening of the relevant religious community far
beyond the boundaries of the official Church. The Church was no
longer identified with the priests, bishops, and popes, or their
doctrinal and sacramental practices; instead, the relevant interpretive
community was simply the community of believers. 39 "For where two
or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of
them." 40
So far, nothing has been said that would distinguish biblical
interpretation from any other form of literary interpretation. But two
main arguments have been advanced against treating the Bible as
literature:
[1] The Bible's claim to truth... is tyrannical-it excludes all other
claims. The world of the Scripture stories is not satisfied with
claiming to be a historically true reality-it insists that it is the only
true world.... Far from seeking, like Homer, merely to let us
forget our own reality for a few hours, it seeks to overcome our
reality; we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to be
elements in its structure of universal history.41
[2(a)] [It is not literature because it is a collection of documents
and not a whole, and about real not invented people....
3& Id. at 76.
39. Cf. LUTHER, supra note 33, at 407 ("[A]Il Christians whatsoever really and truly belong
to the religious class, and there is no difference among them except in so far as they do different
work."); id. at 409 ("[Tlhere is, at bottom, really no other difference between laymen, priests,
princes, bishops, or, in Romanist terminology, between religious and secular, than that of office
or occupation, and not that of Christian status."); id. at 414 ("Think it over for yourself. You
must acknowledge that there are good Christians among us who have the true faith, spirit,
understanding, word, and mind of Christ. Why ever should one reject their opinion and
judgment, and accept those of the pope, who has neither that faith nor that spirit?").
40. Matthew 18:20.
41. ERICH AUERBACH, MIMESIS 17-18 (5th ed. 1971).
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[2(b)] .. . [I]t is not literature because it consists of laws, proph-
ecies, wisdom sayings and many other genres that we do not
normally classify as literature.4 2
The first argument may be termed the argument from authority.
The institutional authority of Church interpretation may have been
displaced by the Reformation, but this loss is more than compensated
for by the inherent authority of Holy Scripture itself. For centuries
the Bible has been the sacred book of Western culture; it is
considered to be the directly revealed word of God and, as such,
necessarily true. The first-century Jewish historian Josephus says of
the Scriptures that
no one has ventured either to add, or to remove, or to alter a
syllable; and it is an instinct with every Jew, from the day of his
birth, to regard them as the decrees of God, to abide by them, and,
if need be, cheerfully to die for them.43
But what does it mean to say that the Bible is necessarily true?
That it should not or need not be interpreted, or is beyond all
interpretation? Saying that the truths of the Bible are directly
revealed without human mediation would be like saying the mind is a
Mirror of Nature. Swift famously parodied this sort of naive
fundamentalism in concluding that the Bible forbids the use of toilet
paper, since it is written in Revelation: "he who is filthy, let him be
filthy still." 44 But James Barr is not writing as a naive fundamentalist
or denying that the Bible has to be interpreted when he says:
The recognition that the Bible is dominated by a religious concern
is no obstacle to the reading of it as literature; but the idea that its
religious teaching must be right and must be accepted as
authoritative does constitute ... a serious block to the enjoyment of
it as literature.45
The objection is not that the Bible must be interpreted; the objection
is that such interpretation seems to imply or require an acceptance of
authority that would not normally be assumed.
This argument from authority may be criticized both from the
perspective of the Bible and from that of literature. First, the
intensely personal responses to the Bible favored by Kierkegaard,
Barth, and Bultmann say, in effect: "On this book depends my life; it
42. JosipovicI, supra note 35, at 298.
43. JOSEPHUS, Against Apion: Or on the Antiquity of the Jews, in 1 WORKS OF JOSEPHUS
162, 179-81 (H. St. John Thackeray trans., 1976) (1926).
44. Revelation 22:11; cf. JONATHAN SwIFT, A TALE OF A TUB 191 (A.G. Guthkelch & D.
Nicoll Smith eds., 1958).
45. James Barr, Reading the Bible As Literature, 56 BULL. JOHN RYLANDS LIBR. 10, 15
(1973-74) (on file with author).
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is too important a matter to leave to others; if I am to read it as it asks
to be read I must shed not only my literary preconceptions but also
every attachment I have to the world. '46 As Ricoeur has cautioned,
A theory of interpretation which at the outset runs straight to the
moment of decision moves too fast.... It is the objectivity of the
text, understood as content-bearer of meaning and demand for
meaning-that begins the existential movement of appropri-
ation.... If there is no objective meaning, then the text no longer
says anything at all.47
Second, the Bible's claim to be uniquely authoritative does not
do justice to the authority of great literature. To return to the
comparison suggested by Auerbach above: Is it fair to say that Homer
seeks "merely to let us forget our own reality for a few hours," to
amuse and entertain us, and not to make us "fit our own life into its
world, feel ourselves to be elements in its structure of universal
history"? After all, it was precisely because of Homer's perceived
authority in ancient Athens that Plato felt the need to counter his
dangerous influence.48 Barr objects that the Bible demands to be read
"as a source of true knowledge about the objects described in [it]-
about God, about the creation of the world, about his redemption of
mankind, about sin and salvation, about the possibility of a future
life. '49 But would that be any less true of Homer, Virgil, Dante,
Shakespeare, Spenser, Milton, Proust, or Tolstoy? More generally,
"the reader who has come to the Bible from the works of Homer or
Dante will want to ask: does not every major work or writer speak
with authority?"50
The second main argument against treating the Bible as
literature may be termed the argument from disunity. To begin with,
we have, separated by centuries, an Old Testament and a New
Testament, both of which feature disparate collections of ancient
documents assembled and edited by unknown committees of ancient
religious leaders. By subject matter, the Bible comprises "history,
romance, law, poems of praise and vituperation, aphorisms, proverbs,
love-songs, visions, and much else besides."51  The criterion of
selection is supposed to be "divine inspiration," but what counts as
46. JosIPovIcI, supra note 35, at 13.
47. PAUL RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 68-69 (Lewis S. Mudge ed.,
1980).
48. See generally ERIC HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO (1963).
49. Barr, supra note 45, at 13.
50. JOSIPOVICI, supra note 35, at 26.
51. Id. at 9.
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divinely inspired seems to change, sometimes as a function of
arbitrary political and social considerations. "Haggai, Zechariah and
Malachi are commonly regarded as the last of the prophets," for
example, "since after them, it was felt, the 'divine spirit' ceased to be
active in Israel. '5 2 To scholars enamored of the disunity thesis, the
search for historical and archaeological information thus seems more
important than the literary analysis of the Bible's distinctive mode of
narration.
This argument from disunity, like the argument from authority,
may be criticized both from the perspective of the Bible and from that
of literature. First, the books of the Bible seem to be more closely
related to each other than the works of any single author:
The books that deal with the history of the world from the Creation
onwards follow each other in roughly chronological order; the
prophets sometimes appear in the historical books and often
mention events that are dealt with more fully there; the Psalms
refer to the Creation, the crossing of the Red Sea and the
Jerusalem Temple; the Gospels, Acts and the Epistles frequently
refer to the earlier books and the last two of course refer constantly
to the Jesus we have encountered in the Gospels; and Revelation
picks up images from Daniel and elsewhere and weaves them into
something new.53
More importantly, there is a grand thematic unity underlying all
these references and correspondences: "It begins where time begins,
with the creation of the world; it ends where time ends, with the
Apocalypse, and it surveys human history in between, or the aspect of
history it is interested in, under the symbolic names of Adam and
Israel. '4
Second, criticisms of the Bible's supposed disunity often reflect
merely the norms of literary coherence derived from certain literary
genres, in particular from the carefully plotted classical novels of the
nineteenth century. These notions of what constitutes unity, "which
are still taken for granted by the majority of those who write about
the Bible, themselves have a history, but a very brief one: it is
doubtful if Shakespeare, let alone Chaucer, would have made much
sense of them. '55 Nor, one might add, would modernists such as
Joyce (Ulysses), Eliot (The Waste Land), or Proust (A la recherche du
temps perdu).
52. Id. at 43.
53. Id. at 11-12.
54. NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE, at xiii (1982).
55. JosiPOvici, supra note 35, at 11.
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What accounts for the enduring separation of biblical
interpretation from literary interpretation? Josipovici offers an
interesting explanation based on the unique role of the Bible in
childhood. "Once the Bible was not a book but stories told us by our
parents. When stories are read to us in childhood we accept them
without question. 56 The Bible thus acquires what we might term a
sort of unearned authority; at the very least, it retains a form of
authority different from the "intellectual authority" we attribute in
later life to works whose arguments and doctrines are intellectually
sound and persuasive.57 The child's relation to the Bible is then
uniquely "perpetuated into adulthood" through public worship
services, which differ from school, for example, in that family and
relatives of all ages participate. Our "sense of awe in relation to the
Bible" is thus reinforced through this powerful association with
community values, where community is defined as a relatively small
group in which shared values can be assumed. 8
Up to about the time of the Reformation, this is where the story
would have ended. "[Tihe men, women and children who filled the
medieval churches and looked up at the stained-glass windows as they
listened to the preachers, were living out an elaborated version of the
childhood experience." But Luther's admonition on the world stage
to "[t]hink it over for yourself" corresponds, in developmental terms,
with "the natural reaction of the adolescent" to the Bible's unearned
authority, "his natural desire to find out for himself... [O]nce Luther
stood up and asserted the need to speak the truth as he saw it and not
pay lip-service to tradition, things could never be quite the same
again.'"9
The adult who takes up the Bible against this background
remembers that its stories once seemed to have tremendous
authority, though not because of their literary qualities. "Going back
to them in later life we have somehow felt that there must be a reason
for their authority, that we must get behind them to find out what
they were really about" 60-questions that would not arise in such
intense form for the adult reader of ordinary literature. Thus,
according to Josipovici, we misread the Bible because we ask too
56. Id. at 4.
57. See Charles W. Colier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority, 35 INQUIRY
145 (1992), reprinted in 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151 (1992).
58. See JOSIPOVICI, supra note 35, at 8.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id. at 27.
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much of it; "it is our anxiety in relation to this particular book that
makes us concentrate on whether we are accurately understanding
the details while ignoring the challenge of responding to the whole. '61
C. Society As the Self
The modern social sciences were basically invented in the
nineteenth century, so it is somewhat anachronistic to speak of social
science before that time. But it is possible to see the stirrings of social
theory and political philosophy since at least the time of Plato. And if
one understands the social sciences in general terms as the
interpretation of human social behavior, that project can be traced
back to an equally venerable metaphor or interpretive paradigm:
Society as the Self.
In Plato's Republic, Socrates considers how best to get at the
nature of justice:
There is, we say, justice of one man; and there is, surely, justice of a
whole city too? ... So then, perhaps there would be more justice in
the bigger and it would be easier to observe closely. If you want,
first we'll investigate what justice is like in the cities. Then, we'll
also go on to consider it in individuals, considering the likeness of
the bigger in the idea of the littler?6
This methodology is justified by an implied parallelism between the
city and man or, more precisely, between the city and the individual
human soul. Later, Plato makes the parallelism explicit: "Isn't it quite
necessary for us to agree that the very same forms and dispositions as
are in the city are in each of us? ... Surely they didn't get there from
any other place. '63
In his analysis of the city, Plato determines that it is composed of
three distinct classes, each of which corresponds to one of the
fundamental parts of the soul. The obvious differences between
people suggest a hierarchy in the city. At the top is the ruling class,
composed of those who are wisest; likewise, in the soul, it is fitting
that reason should govern. Just as only the wise can take
disinterested account of the genuine, long-term needs of the whole
city and not just themselves, so reason takes into consideration the
61. Id. at 34; cf. id. at 17 (explaining that the Torah also "must be perceived as a unity,
regardless of the number and types of smaller units that form the building blocks of its
composition").
62. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 368e-369a (Allan Bloom trans., 1968); cf id. at 434d-e
(Socrates further explains the benefit of looking at justice first in the city and then in one man.).
63. Id. at 435e; cf. id. at 544d-e (arguing that human characters and dispositions make up
cities).
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interests of the whole soul and not just itself. In the middle, a warrior
class ensures the physical safety of the city, and this class corresponds
to courage or spirit in the soul. Finally, at the bottom of the city's
hierarchy is the productive or money-making class, which
corresponds to desire in the soul; both are concerned only with their
own gratification, to the exclusion of any wider concerns.
For Plato, justice in the city consists of each class's doing just that
one thing for which it is by nature best fitted. Justice is thus
dependent upon the virtue of moderation, in the sense of "the control
of what is by nature worse by that which is by nature better-that
control through which the whole is in harmony." 64 Likewise, when
the parts of the soul "mind their own business" and do that, and only
that, for which they are naturally best suited, a balanced and unified
state arises that we would term "psychic harmony" and that Plato
defines as justice:
And in truth justice was, as it seems, something of this sort;
however, not with respect to a man's minding his external business,
but with respect to what is within, with respect to what truly
concerns him and his own. He doesn't let each part in him mind
other people's business or the three classes in the soul meddle with
each other, but really sets his own house in good order and rules
himself; he arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and
harmonizes the three parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic
scale, lowest, highest and middle. And if there are some other parts
in between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one from
many, moderate and harmonized.6 5
All of which leads directly to Plato's conclusion that "the just man
will not be any different from the just city with respect to the form
itself of justice, but will be like it." 66
Following in Plato's footsteps, Aristotle understands man as a
"political animal," "one whose nature is to live with others" in
society, "man's natural habitat. '67 The end of politics is the good for
man and, according to Aristotle, "even if the end is the same for a
single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events
64. Leo Strauss, Plato, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 7, 46 (Leo Strauss &
Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987); cf. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 62, at 430e, 431e-
432a, 433a-b.
65. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 62, at 443d-e.
66. Id. at 435b.
67. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253a2 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943); ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1169b18 (David Ross trans., revised by J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson,
1992); JONATHAN LEAR, ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND 311 (1988).
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something greater and more complete both to attain and to
preserve."68
In his Ethics, Aristotle inquires into man's distinctive nature and
function. The life of nutrition and growth is not peculiar to man, nor
is that of perception. Aristotle thus focuses on man's unique
''rational soul," of which one element possesses reason and thinks;
however, there is "also another natural element beside the [reason],
which fights against and resists that principle, '69 but ultimately obeys
it (at least in the well balanced man). "[T]he appetitive and in
general the desiring element in a sense shares in [reason], in so far as
it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of [paying
heed to] one's father or one's friends."70
Notice that Aristotle's categories of the soul are all drawn from
social functions: listening and obeying, father and friends. He leaves
little doubt that this hierarchy derived from social functions also
defines the truly human function in the individual soul:
[J]ust as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly
identified with the most authoritative element in it, so is a
man .... [A] man is said to have or not to have self-control
according as his [intellect] has or has not the control, on the
assumption that this is the man himself.71
The natural subordination to reason in the soul is reflected in a
properly conceived and planned social order. When the naturally
governing element controls the soul, it is in good order; when the
proper political and legal choices have been made, the conventional
order reflects the natural order.
The metaphor of Society as the Self remains an interpretive
commonplace throughout the middle ages and well into the
eighteenth century. For Aquinas, deeply steeped in Aristotelian
thought, a city without a governing political regime is like a body
without a soul. In Julius Caesar, Brutus says:
Between the acting of a dreadful thing
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream:
The genius and the mortal instruments
Are then in council; and the state of man,
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then
68. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 67, at 1094b7-9.
69. Id. at 1102b17.
70. Id. at 1102b30-32.
71. Id. at 1168b31-35.
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The nature of an insurrection.72
And even when Hume, in direct opposition to the classical tradition,
declares that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, he
still uses the traditional social hierarchy of master and slave (albeit in
inverted form) to shed new light on the self.
More often, the self is used to interpret society. For Luther, to
say that secular authorities have no jurisdiction over religious office-
holders "is as much as to say that the hand ought to do nothing to
help when the eye suffers severely."73  One of the most common
justifications for social distinctions was the seemingly corresponding
stratification of the human organism:
Whereupon as it would be a thing monstrous and incommodious to
see a human body wholly compounded of heads arms legs or of
other members uniform in themselves, so would it be altogether as
disproportionable and a thing of itself insufficient if all men in a city
were artificers, husbandmen, soldiers, judges, or of one self
condition and quality.74
Likewise, different functions in the body politic are justified on the
analogy to the different functions of the human body.
[T]he soul's parted, though in substance one,
Into understanding, will, and memory....
The heads are those above-recited three,
The under-rulers thoughts and fancies are,
The citizens the outward senses be,
The rurals be the bodies rare
(Which often make the soul most poor and bare);
For when these riff-raffs in commotion rise,
And all will have their will, or nought will spare,
The soul, poor soul, they then in rage surprise,
And rob her of her wealth and blind her of her eyes. 75
But when these elements are properly reconciled, the virtuous state
has "good order and policy by good laws established and set, and by
heads and rulers put in effect, by the which the whole body, as by
reason, is governed and ruled ... one loving one another as members
and parts of one body. '76
Interpreting society in terms of the self follows the normal order
of beginning with what seems most natural and proceeding to that
72. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 2, sc. 1.
73. LUTHER, supra note 33, at 410.
74. ANNIBALE ROMEI, THE COURTIER'S ACADEMIE 248 (John Kepers trans., 1968)
(1598).
75. DAVIES OF HEREFORD, MIRUM IN MODUM (1602).
76. Thomas Starkey, Dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lupset 45 ff. (Early
English Text Society ed. 1878).
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which can be planned and arranged in conformity with the natural
order. The natural subordinations in the self have to be observed if
we are to be well-adjusted, virtuous, and happy. To the extent that
society resembles a human organism, it seems that the state's
functions and institutions should be conceived and planned to reflect
these important human qualities and conditions.
Nonetheless, the durability of the "Society as the Self" paradigm
is also shown by other uses that can be made of it. Stuart Hampshire,
for example, suggests that, "reversing the tradition," we start at the
other end of the analogy and proceed in the opposite direction:
The procedures necessary to any decent social order are to be seen
as natural, and the analogous processes in the mind are to be
thought of as constructed and distinguished by convention: it is by
linguistic convention that mental processes in the minds of
individuals are to be seen as the shadows of publicly identifiable
procedures that are pervasive across different cultures. 77
Hampshire has in mind such processes of public reasoning as
deliberating, judging, adjudicating, reviewing, and examining. When
these processes of reasoning are "cut loose from any supposedly
identifiable psychological faculty called 'reason,"' the traditional
mental hierarchy and even the notion of "parts of the soul" are called
very much into question. 78
In like manner, Theodor Adorno's theory of the "authoritarian"
and "democratic" personalities draws on preexisting social categories
in an interpretation and critical reexamination of the inner self.79 This
theme of "the Self as Social" may also be seen in Freud's theory of
the conscious and unconscious and in his later theory of the ego,
superego, and id. Against the classical Greek conception of the finely
balanced, harmonized, unified soul, Freud paints a picture of
inevitable inner conflict, of civil war in the psyche. When we dream,
says Freud,
the top slides off the caldron, and we see another self, far less
beholden to convention and to moral niceties than the waking I. At
night, we discover that nothing human is foreign to us: incest,
murder, bizarre cruelties, sexual urges of all sorts arise directly, or
in distorted form, within the dreaming theater of the mind.... At
night, we discover what our precivilized self is and what it wants.80
77. Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Strife, 65 PROC. ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS'N 19, 19-20
(Nov. 1991).
78. Id. at 20, 23; cf. STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1989).
79. See generally T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950).
80. Mark Edmundson, Save Sigmund Freud, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 13, 1997, at 34.
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Civilization requires prohibition, and along with custom, law, and
morality, an inner agency of authority also seems to function within
us as a counterforce to precivilized drives. Freud's superego is
patterned on those other forms of social order and serves, within the
individual, as society's garrison against the onrush of desire. In a
grand elaboration of "the Self as Social" metaphor, Freud suggests
that the broadest known social conflicts may be defused, or at least
stabilized, in the psyche.
III. LAW As INTERPRETATION
Like the other intellectual disciplines discussed above, law makes
use of interpretive paradigms or metaphors, and in general there is a
strong interpretive basis for legal decision making. In what follows I
shall consider what I term law's "common law narrative," its
"constitutional narrative," and its use of the community-society
paradigm.
Three distinct senses of a professional narrative may be
distinguished: (1) A "simplifying interpretation" that helps make
sense of law as a precondition for legal practice; (2) an "interpretive
practice" that gives legal materials something like the narrative unity
of a book; and (3) the use of an "interpretive paradigm" or metaphor
in law.
A. The Common Law Narrative
1. Blackstone and the Origins of Legal Authority
The common law is based on and derived from what might be
termed "legalized customs." These leges non scriptae "receive their
binding power, and the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage,
and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom." More
specifically, according to Blackstone, "in our law the goodness of a
custom depends upon its having been used time out of mind .... This
it is that gives it its weight and authority. '81
Unfortunately, it is of course the oldest customs that are the most
difficult to establish, "nothing being more difficult than to ascertain
the precise beginning and first spring of an ancient and long
established custom," especially when it is one that, by definition, is
81. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64. See generally Albert W. Alschuler,
Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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"of higher antiquity than memory or history can reach." Blackstone
offers an equally paradoxical alternative explanation for the authority
of the common law-that it "rests entirely upon general reception
and usage." But again, "the only method of proving, that this or that
maxim is a rule of the common law, is by shewing that it hath been
always the custom to observe it. '"82
At this point, says Blackstone, a "very natural, and very
material" question arises: "how are these customs or maxims to be
known, and by whom is their validity to be determined?" Without
the slightest hesitation or deliberation, Blackstone answers his own
question in his very next sentence: "The answer is, by the judges in
the several courts of justice." They are "the depositary of the laws;
the living oracles," whose knowledge of the law of the land is derived
from experience, study, "and from being long personally accustomed
to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. ' '83
In other words, it seems obvious to Blackstone that, at least in
terms of professional competence, the most authoritative interpreters
of the common law are the judges, past and present. And indeed
their judicial decisions are "the principal and most authoritative
evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall
form a part of the common law." Blackstone makes clear that the
judges are expected not merely to make decisions and render
judgments that, along with all the proceedings, "are carefully
registered and preserved, under the name of records." The judges are
also expected to explain their judgments, to offer an interpretation of
the law and the facts that justifies the decision. "[T]he numerous
volumes of reports which furnish the lawyer's library" prominently
include "the reasons the court gave for their judgment .... And these
serve as indexes to, and also to explain, the records." In rendering
judgment in an individual case, then, the common law judge is
simultaneously applying the law and declaring what the law is.
[T]he first ground and chief corner stone of the laws of
England ... is, general immemorial custom, or common law, from
time to time declared in the decisions of the courts of justice; which
decisions are preserved among our public records, explained in our
reports, and digested for general use in the authoritative writings of
the venerable sages of the law.84
82. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *67-*68.
83. Id. at *69.
84. Id. at *69, *71, *73.
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2. Langdell and the Texts of the Law
The most influential expositor of the common law in America
was Christopher Columbus Langdell. 85  The "standard account" of
Langdell's teaching emphasizes his formalist, conceptualist, almost
deductive "science" of rule-governed decision making; but in
introducing the case law system at Harvard, Langdell also guaranteed
that law study would focus on the interpretation of legal "texts." Like
Luther before him, Langdell introduced his students to the original
sources of their subject in "strange new pamphlets, reports bereft of
their only useful part, the head-notes! '86 If law was to be worthy of
university study, reasoned Langdell, "it was indispensable to establish
at least two things: first, that law is a science; secondly, that all the
available materials of that science are contained in printed books."
As a corollary to the second point, "if printed books are the ultimate
sources of all legal knowledge," then "every student who would
obtain any mastery of law as a science must resort to these ultimate
sources."87
In considering the reported cases the "original sources" of law,88
Langdell is proceeding very much in the tradition of Blackstone (for
whom, it will be recalled, judicial decisions were "the principal and
most authoritative evidence" of the common law). As one of
Langdell's followers put it,
the student should not only be encouraged to investigate the law in
its original sources, but should be distinctly discouraged from
regarding as law, what is, in fact, simply the conclusions of writers
whose opinions are based upon the material to which the student
can be given access.... [T]he opinion of the court giving the
85. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
86. 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY
LEGAL CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 372 (1908); cf. GERALD L. BRUNS, HERMENEUTICS
ANCIENT AND MODERN 139-40 (1992):
The Bible studied in the medieval schools was, we know, a glossed text, the Glossa
Ordinaria, in which each verse is surrounded by notes and commentaries handed down
from the Church Fathers.... [W]hen Martin Luther began preparing his first lectures
as professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg[, he] produced for his students
something like a modern, as opposed to medieval, text of the Bible-its modernity
consisting precisely in the white space around the text.
87. Christopher C. Langdell, Address to Harvard Law School Association, in A RECORD
OF THE COMMEMORATION... OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 84, 85, 86 (Univ.
Press 1887); cf. id. at 86-87 ("From what I have already said it easily follows.., that a good
academic training, especially in the study of language, is a necessary qualification for the
successful study of law.").
88. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii
(1871).
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reasons for the conclusion reached, is really the only authoritative
treatise which we have in our law.89
And in insisting that the study of law must be scientific, Langdell
is employing the broader, nineteenth-century understanding of
"science," in the sense of Wissenschaft.90 The science he has in mind
is certainly not an empirical science, any more than Galileo's was;
according to Langdell, "the cases which are useful and necessary for
this purpose at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion
to all that have been reported. The vast majority are useless and
worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study." 91 Langdell
also maintains that the law library is to him and his Students "all that
the museum of natural history is to the zo6logists, all that the
botanical garden is to the botanists," D but it is hard to imagine
zoologists or botanists declaring the "vast majority" of their
specimens "useless and worse than useless."
In reality, Langdell's science of case law serves as a "simplifying
interpretation" that helps make sense of law as a precondition for
legal practice. Already in the nineteenth century, complained
Langdell, "the great and rapidly increasing number of reported cases
in every department of law" was beginning to make legal
generalizations difficult. 93
The volume of cases was so large that there was no way in which a
lawyer could study them all.... In the nineteenth century a new
solution to the problem became fashionable. This claimed that the
right way to acquire a mastery of legal principles was not to read
large numbers of cases, but rather to concentrate attention upon
the limited number of "leading" cases which provided the best
illustrations of their application, or those in which a principle was
first clearly expounded.94
Earlier writers had published collections of "leading cases" and
commended them metaphorically to their students as "so many nuclei
of future legal acquisitions," "so many landmarks upon the trackless
wilds of the law," "the great 'lighthouses of the law,' which never fail,
89. William A. Keener, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 143, 144-45 (1892).
90. See GERHARD WAHRIG, DEUTSCHES WORTERBUCH 4166 (1975) (defining Wissen-
schaft as an "ordered, logically structured, coherent field of knowledge").
91. LANGDELL, supra note 88, at vi.
92. Langdell, supra note 87, at 87.
93. LANGDELL, supra note 88, at vi; see also M. DAWES, EPITOME OF THE LAW OF
LANDED PROPERTY (1818) ("[T]he first principles of the science are obscured by their
bulk... and the law, like a river which never runs back to its source, expands and deepens in its
current, and grows more and more arduous to fathom.").
94. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 3-4 (1995) ("In much
the same way one might master a language by concentrating upon its best writers.").
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are never dimmed, and are most visible in those times when the need
for guide is mostly felt." 95 Langdell's contribution was to provide a
theory for this interpretive practice:
[T]he number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is
commonly supposed .... [A]nd much the shortest and best, if not
the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the
cases in which it is embodied.... It seemed to me, therefore, to be
possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example,
and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select,
classify, and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any
important degree to the growth, development, or establishment of
any of its essential doctrines.96
The compiler of a casebook is essentially an editor of the
tradition. In "selecting, classifying, and arranging all the cases" of
contracts, Langdell is offering an interpretation that simultaneously
simplifies and makes sense of this field of law. Unlike traditional
commentators and textbook writers, he operates wholly within the
confines of the original sources in which the doctrines are
"embodied," making his enterprise seem more modest by
comparison. But an interpretation it remains. It is as if Langdell
were a paleontologist at an excavation who first discards most of the
fossils as "useless and worse than useless," then proceeds to arrange
the rest in what appears to him the truest and most revealing order of
their evolution. 97
3. Legal Innovation in the Common Law
An early German observer of the case method in American law
schools noted that "it really teaches the pupil to think in the way that
any practical lawyer-whether dealing with written or with unwritten
law-ought to and has to think."98 In other words, the study of case
law is not essentially different from the practice of the case lawyer.99
This can be shown by examining how legal innovation is interpreted
in the common law tradition.
The first and predominant method is to interpret legal
95. Id. at 5-6.
96. LANGDELL, supra note 88, at vi-vii (emphasis added).
97. See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND
THE NATURE OF HISTORY (1989).
98. JOSEF REDLICH, Essential Reason for the Success of the Case Method, in THE COMMON
LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 35,39 (1914).
99. See J.C. Gray, Methods of Legal Education Part IV, 1 YALE L.J. 159, 160 (1892) ("To
extract law from facts is the thing that a lawyer has to do all his life; ... a student cannot begin it
too early.").
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innovation in terms of existing judicial precedents and legal doctrines.
A classic example is Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's 1890 article
on The Right to Privacy.100 In their opening sentence the authors state
that the individual's right to full protection in person and property is
"a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found
necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and
extent of such protection."' 10 1 In the face of social, political, economic,
and technological change, "the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society." 102
Warren and Brandeis trace the evolution of a legal right of
privacy to the general refinement of sensibilities attendant upon the
advance of civilization. In very early times, the law gave a remedy
only for physical interference with life and property; then the
protection against actual bodily injury was extended to cover the
psychic harm occasioned by the mere attempt to do such injury.
Much later the law of nuisance was developed. Regard for human
emotions soon extended the sphere of immunity beyond the body of
the individual, as reflected in actions for slander, libel, and alienation
of affection. A similar development can be seen in the law of
property, where the protections for corporeal property have been
extended to intangible property, to the products and processes of the
mind.
"This development of the law was inevitable," write Warren and
Brandeis. 1 3 "Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal
recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes
the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection,
without the interposition of the legislature. '" 104 A similar interpretive
procedure can be seen in Warren and Brandeis's approach to "the
next step": "It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law
affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the
privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of
such protection is."105 Making use of legal analogies already
developed in the law, Warren and Brandeis find such a principle in
the common law right to determine whether, and to what extent,
100. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890); see also PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 22-
51 (Richard C. Turkington et al.eds., 1999).
101. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 100, at 193.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 195.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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personal thoughts, sentiments, and emotions will be communicated to
others. This right, in turn, is interpreted as part of the more general
right to the immunity of the person-the right to one's personality.
But even while advocating what amounts to the recognition of a new
legal right, Warren and Brandeis remain firmly in the role of
interpreters of the tradition:
If we are correct in this conclusion, the existing law affords a
principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the
individual .... If then, the decisions indicate a general right to
privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should receive
the same protection, whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in
conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression. 106
Borrowing a term from constitutional law, we may describe the
traditional common law approach to innovation as "interpretivist."' 17
It sees itself as interpreting the tradition-in a new way, perhaps, but
nevertheless as bound by and remaining within "the four corners" of
the tradition. The classic common law approach to innovation is
accordingly: (1) state the problem; (2) propose a solution; and (3)
show how the common law, properly reinterpreted, already affords
the proposed solution.108
Corresponding to the distinction in constitutional law, there is
also a not-insignificant "noninterpretivist" tradition in the common
law approach to innovation. A classic example is Lord Coleridge's
opinion in the famous case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens.0 9 Lord
Coleridge consults various definitions of murder in "books of
authority" and finds no support for the proposition that one may
lawfully take away the life of another in order to save one's own life.
But "[d]ecided cases there are none." There was an American case in
which "it was decided, correctly indeed, that sailors had no right to
throw passengers overboard to save themselves"; but since that case
was decided on "the somewhat strange ground" that the selection of
those to be sacrificed should be by drawing lots, the American case
"can hardly... be an authority satisfactory to a court in this
country." 110
106. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
107. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 541-42 (Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan eds., 13th
ed. 1997).
108. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining
the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 200 (1991).
109. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); see also A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE
COMMON LAW (1984); Glanville Williams, A Commentary on R. v. Dudley and Stephens, 8
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 94 (1977).
110. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 284-85.
[Vol. 76:779
LA W AS INTERPRETATION
Instead, Lord Coleridge bases his conclusions on the principle
that "the absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal
consequence," and on the "moral necessity" of self-sacrifice instead
of self-preservation. "[I]t is enough in a Christian country to remind
ourselves of the Great Example whom we profess to follow.""' In the
course of this noninterpretivist review of religion and morality, Lord
Coleridge concedes that the defendants were subjected to suffering
most awful; nevertheless, they would be comforted to learn that "[w]e
are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves,
and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy."
112
The closest American counterpart to Dudley & Stephens is
probably the equally celebrated case of Riggs v. Palmer, in which a
statute of wills was read against a background standard of common
law principles and maxims." 3 As Professor Dworkin notes, "the court
cited the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a
background standard against which to read the statute of wills and in
this way justified a new interpretation of that statute."' n4 As authority
for its interpretation the court cited numerous "learned authors,"
including Aristotle, Blackstone, Bacon, Puffendorf, and Rutherford,
as well as the Code Napoleon, the Civil Code of Lower Canada, and
the Decalogue. "[G]eneral, fundamental maxims of the common
law," writes the court, "are dictated by public policy, have their
foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and
have nowhere been superseded by statutes.""' 5
The only case cited approvingly by the court involved a murder
to recover under a life insurance policy (whereas in Riggs the devisee
murdered the testator to acquire his property under the will). "It
would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country," wrote
Justice Field for the U.S. Supreme Court, if the insurance scheme
should succeed; likewise, the New York court reasoned that it "would
be a reproach to the jurisprudence of our state" if the murderous
grandson should recover under the will." 6 Of an adverse decision
proffered by the dissent, "as a case quite like this," Judge Earl,
111. Id. at 287.
112. Id. at 288.
113. 115 N.Y. 506 (1889); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary
Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE 115, 118-24 (Sanford Levinson & Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988).
114. RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 28-29
(1977).
115. Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 511-12.
116. Id. at 512-13.
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
writing for the court, states simply that "I am unwilling to assent to
the doctrine of that case.""1 7
The theory of noninterpretive common law reasoning has been
ably articulated by Benjamin Cardozo, both in his judicial and
extrajudicial writings. Most notably, in Hynes v. New York Central
Railroad Co., Judge Cardozo allowed a "lad of sixteen" to recover
damages for injuries on defendant's land, even though he was
technically a trespasser (and thus an "outlaw," as Cardozo more
rhetorically put it).1"s As in Riggs, Cardozo's decision seems to turn
on background principles and maxims.
This case is a striking instance of the dangers of "a jurisprudence of
conceptions" .... In such circumstances, there is little help in
pursuing general maxims to ultimate conclusions. They have been
framed alio intuitu. They must be reformulated and readapted to
meet exceptional conditions.119
Citing unspecified "considerations of analogy, of convenience, of
policy, and of justice" (but conspicuously not the existing law of torts
or property), Cardozo concluded that the railroad is liable.120
For one of the preeminent jurists of our time, this means that
"[n]o reason is given for the conclusion.... In his soaring peroration
Cardozo has given no reason why the plaintiff should win. ' 21 In The
Nature of the Judicial Process, published in the same year as the
Hynes case, Cardozo elaborates on his noninterpretivist judicial
philosophy. In a section entitled, significantly, "The Judge As
Legislator," Cardozo shows just how closely related these two legal
roles are for him:
[The] power of interpretation must be lodged somewhere, and the
custom of the constitution has lodged it in the judges.... Innovate,
however, to some extent, he must, for with new conditions there
must be new rules .... [The judge, like the legislator] is legislating
within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits for thejudge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the
open spaces in the law. 22
Perhaps Judge Posner may be forgiven for complaining that
"[p]assages like these... leav[e] unresolved the basic question of how
117. Id. at 514.
118. 231 N.Y. 229, 229, 231 (1921); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATION 48-55 (1990).
119. Hynes, 231 N.Y. at 235-36 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 236.
121. POSNER, supra note 118, at 53.
122. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Lecture III. The Method of Sociology. The Judge As a
Legislator, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98, 135, 137, 113 (1921).
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the judge is to decide cases that fall in the open area (and indeed how
to demarcate that area)."123
B. The Constitutional Narrative
1. Interpreting the Constitution
American constitutional law begins with a grand interpretive
gesture. Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion for the Court in
Marbury v. Madison124 effectively establishes the power of judicial
review, though this power is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution.
Marshall's argument rests on two main bases: (1) general structural
considerations, reinforced through the supremacy of the law of the
Constitution over ordinary legislation; (2) general considerations of
the judicial role in interpreting law.
By its own terms, the Constitution of the United States is "the
supreme Law of the Land."1  Emphasizing the "supremacy,"
Marshall distinguishes ordinary legislation from the original,
fundamental act of establishing a constitutional system:
The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it,
nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore,
so established, are deemed fundamental. And ... the authority
from which they proceed is supreme.2 6
Emphasizing the "law," Marshall declares that the Constitution is a
species of law: "a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means .... Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation. '1 27
Marshall then turns to general considerations of judicial
competence to interpret and enforce the law. If the Constitution is a
species of "law," then one need look no farther than to Blackstone
for authority in support of Marshall's next, seemingly innocuous
proposition: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is," both with respect to ordinary laws
and to the fundamental law of the Constitution.2 8 This answers the
question, "Who decides?"
123. POSNER, supra note 118, at 30.
124. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
125. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
126. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
127. Id. at 177; cf id. at 178 ("[Tjhe constitution is to be considered, in court, as a
paramount law.").
12& Id. at 177.
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As for "how" to decide, Marshall simply applies ordinary,
traditional presumptions as to the judicial role.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.... This is of
the very essence of judicial duty. 129
Moreover, the Constitution itself vests "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States" in the federal courts, and "extend[s]" this judicial
power to "all cases.., arising under the constitution. '"13° Could it
have been the intention of those who granted this power "to say that
in using it the constitution should not be looked into?"'' Or that a
case arising under the Constitution should be decided "without
examining the instrument under which it arises?"13 2 "This is," says
Marshall, "too extravagant to be maintained. ' 133
Beyond instituting the power of judicial review, Marshall also
establishes in McCulloch v. Maryland134 a powerful interpretive role
for the federal judiciary in constitutional adjudication. Part of this
argument proceeds by showing the absurd consequences of denying
such an interpretive role, by using "easy cases" reminiscent of Swift's
parody of biblical literalism and fundamentalism. Marshall is
concerned with establishing a relatively broad and _ liberal
interpretation of the "necessary and proper" clause, enabling
Congress to make laws in the exercise of its enumerated powers.1 35
One of those powers is "[t]o establish post offices and post-roads.' 1 36
Shall we deny that this power extends to carrying the mail along the
post road, or from one post office to another? And what about the
right to punish those who steal letters from a post office, or rob the
mail? That power is not explicitly provided for either.
All of which brings us to Marshall's insistence on "a fair
construction of the whole instrument" and his famous admonition
that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.' ' 37 A constitution that contained "an accurate detail of
all the subdivisions" of its great powers, and of all the means, "in all
129. Id. at 177-78.
130. Id. at 178; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
131. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
136. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 417.
137. Id. at 406-07.
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future time," by which government should execute its powers, would
"partake of the prolixity of a legal code" (perhaps a tax code). 138 The
essential nature of a constitution, then,
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.... We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the
government are limited, and that its limits are not to be
transcended. But we think the sound construction of the
constitution must allow to the national legislature that
discretion... which will enable that body to perform the high
duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.139
By refusing to conceive constitutional interpretation narrowly,
Marshall ensured for the young republic broad national powers of
government commensurate with its ambitious and rapidly unfolding
destiny.
2. Interpreting Standards of Review
The passage last quoted above from McCulloch is followed by a
key sentence frequently cited by the Supreme Court throughout its
history:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.14°
Here the theory of broad, liberal constitutional interpretation is
concretized in an operative formula. It is what we would today call
the standard of deferential review, and it functions as a basic
interpretive paradigm or model for analysis.
This interpretive paradigm of deferential review reflects the
prevailing political theory of the Constitution, and in particular the
fundamental separation of judicial and legislative powers. As
Marshall shortly clarifies: "[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is
really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the
government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its
138. Id. at 406.
139. Id. at 407, 421.
140. Id. at 421; see also Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165,
186 (1985):
Almost nothing in McCulloch presaged the complexity and ambiguity of this passage.
The thrust of all the arguments had been that the necessary and proper clause enlarged
Congress' power and permitted the use of any means it thought useful. The
pronouncement, however, suggested that courts should decide whether the means
chosen are "appropriate" and whether they are "plainly adapted" to their ends.
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necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and to tread on legislative ground. '141 To the legislatures
are entrusted the weighing and balancing of public policy concerns;
the courts merely police the outer boundaries of constitutionality.
The standard of deferential review was further clarified in an
influential 1893 article by James B. Thayer entitled The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.14 2 Thayer
points out that legislatures have been entrusted by their constitutions
with the preliminary and, in many if not most cases, the final
determination of the constitutionality of legislation. Only as some
individual may find it in his private interest to litigate the matter does
the occasion even arise for the courts to intervene. Otherwise, "it is
the legislature to whom this power is given,-this power, not merely
of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the
constitution.' 1 43 Thus Thayer considers that the "primary authority to
interpret" is given to the legislatures; and where a power so
momentous is given, "the actual determinations of the body to whom
it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect."' 144 Or to put it
the other way: Where the opportunity of judges to check and correct
unconstitutional acts is, as was foreseen, so limited and episodic, "the
extent of their control, when they do have the opportunity, should
also be narrow. ' 145
Three stages in the development of the standard of deferential review
may be traced. In 1793, Judge Roan of the General Court of Virginia,
in finding a law unconstitutional, nevertheless cautioned that: "the
violation must be plain and clear," or there might be danger of the
judiciary preventing the operation of laws which might be productive
of much public good.146
By 1811 the principle had evolved as follows:
[Flor weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle in
construing constitutions by the Supreme Court of the United
States, by this Court, and every other court of reputation in the
United States, that an Act of the legislature is not to be declared
void unless the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave
no room for reasonable doubt. 47
141. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423.
142. 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
143. Id. at 136.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 136-37.
146. Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 20, 61 (1793) (emphasis added).
147. Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117, 123 (1811) (emphasis added).
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The standard of reasonable doubt is imposed on juries in criminal
cases because of the great gravity of an incorrect determination. The
same standard is self-imposed on courts in reviewing civil jury
verdicts because they are revising the work of another department
primarily charged with making such determinations. Both rationales
support the use of the standard in the judicial review of legislation.
Thayer explains the third stage in the development of a
deferential review standard as follows. Focusing on the "naked
judicial question" can have the perverse effect of leading one to
disregard legislative considerations altogether. But the court's work
is not done when it has found legislation unconstitutional.
Having ascertained all this, yet there remains a question-the really
momentous question-whether, after all, the court can disregard
the Act. It cannot do this as a mere matter of course,-merely
because it is concluded that upon a just and true construction the
law is unconstitutional.... It can only disregard the Act when those
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake,
but have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to
rational question.148
This rule recognizes that a constitution may admit of different
interpretations, that what seems unconstitutional to one person may
reasonably not seem so to another, that within the range of legislative
choice and judgment the constitution does not impose any particular
option on the legislature, but that "whatever choice is rational is
constitutional.'1149
Thus a rule that starts out emphasizing certainty ends up seeming
to place someone's sanity in question. In any event, "rationality
review" has proved to be a particularly durable interpretive formula,
one that even dictates results when it can plausibly be invoked.
Justice Holmes momentarily found himself on the losing side in
Lochner v. New York, but constitutional history has vindicated his
dissenting view that "a constitution.., is made for people of
fundamentally differing views" and that legislation must be upheld
"unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law. '150
The power of the formula is shown by its successful invocation in
148. Thayer, supra note 142, at 144 (emphasis added).
149. Id. As Thayer puts it later, upholding a statute as "constitutional" should really be
expressed as: "[N]ot unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 151.
150. 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905).
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another decision that has not stood the test of time. In Gitlow v. New
York, the Supreme Court conceded for the first time that the First
Amendment applied to the states. Nevertheless, the Gitlow Court
went on to uphold a "criminal anarchy" statute that today would be
considered an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech, on
the theory that "[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of the statute" (citing a case about the sale of alcoholic
beverages). "'[T]he State is primarily the judge of regulations
required in the interest of public safety and welfare;' and ... its police
'statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbi-
trary or unreasonable"' (citing a decision requiring a railroad com-
pany to construct a sidewalk).1'
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."'152 What
was missing from the Gitlow Court's judicial vocabulary was finally
supplied in the Carolene Products footnote of 1938: a rationale for
reining in what has become a "presumption" (and a virtually irrefu-
table one) of constitutionality. In fact, Carolene Products supplied
three such rationales: for legislation (1) "within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution," (2) restricting the "political processes," and (3)
directed at "discrete and insular minorities.' 15 3 All three rationales
have been fleshed out in an elaborate scheme of "strict" or
"heightened" scrutiny. 5 4  But, of course, a two-level standard of
review was not to be the final word either. To round out the
architectonic, intermediate scrutiny should perhaps be mentioned as
well.'
The modern levels of scrutiny doctrine has become a basic
interpretive tool-arguably the basic interpretive tool-in contem-
porary constitutional analysis. It diverts attention away from the
development of substantive constitutional doctrine and toward a rule
of administration and its corresponding (usually complicated)
formula.
Throughout modern constitutional law.., much of the Justices'
intellectual energy is not directed at the actual resolution of cases at
hand. It is directed at the difficult, complex, but preliminary issue
151. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1925).
152. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 62 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
153. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
154. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
75-77 (1980).
155. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (discussing gender discrimination and the
intermediate level of scrutiny).
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of determining the proper test to be applied in a defined class of
cases.
156
Constitutional interpretation in the modern formulaic style thus
"affects the content that the Court finds in the Constitution" and
ultimately itself becomes "a doctrine, a legally effective text rather
than an imperfect description of something else." '157
3. Periodizations of the Constitutional Past
Another basic interpretive schema in constitutional law is what
might be termed the periodization of constitutional history. The facts
of history cannot make sense until they are related to each other and
brought together in some kind of coherent pattern or unity. To make
sense of our constitutional past, we construct a meaningful narrative
out of its main periods, which have been specially selected for their
significance to the overall story.
The simplest and most basic periodization is the division between
present and past, or the modern and the traditional. In terms of
constitutional history, "we might understand 'modernity' as the
moment in which the period of the Founding becomes so distant that
it begins to seem foreign to us." '158 Using a somewhat different
criterion, that of "lived experience," Bruce Ackerman places the
dividing line of modernity at the point where "living Americans
walked the political stage."
As I write these words in 1988, darkness is beginning to set over the
interwar period.... The constitutional meaning of the New Deal,
like that of the Civil War or the Founding itself, will soon enough
156. Nagel, supra note 140, at 203-04.
157. Id. at 169, 187. And unfortunately there are indications that "the formulaic
Constitution" may be self-perpetuating:
[Miost constitutional law casebooks are forced by coverage pressure to print only a
small part of most opinions. The Court's formulas always survive the editing process.
Supreme Court clerks mastered those formulas and were rewarded with high grades;
the formulas may be the only way they know of doing constitutional law.
Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the
Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1742-43 (1990) (book review).
158. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 401 n.1 (4th ed. 2000). Similar considerations are involved in the editing of a
casebook, as these particular editors freely acknowledge:
Every casebook involves the construction of a canon-a set of materials and
approaches that the editors believe that every student who wishes to master the subject
should know. The present casebook is no exception. Indeed, the authors have been
particularly conscious of the existing canons of constitutional thought and the kinds of
choices that are involved both in the materials presented and in their editing, order,
and arrangement.
Id. at xxix.
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be determined exclusively by Americans whose first acquaintance
with the facts was gained indirectly. 159
Beyond the basic distinction between what counts as present and
past, the periodization of constitutional history has received a number
of different interpretations. Brest, Levinson, Balkin, and Amar focus
on the degree to which the Supreme Court's role and its relationship
to democracy become problematic. Up to the Civil War, the Supreme
Court's assertions of judicial power were modest, with federal statutes
being struck down only in Marbury and Dred Scott. Between the
Civil War and the New Deal, both federal and state legislation began
to be struck down with increasing frequency and on a number of
grounds. "Partly as a result, the Supreme Court increasingly becomes
understood as an actor in the political system, and the relatively rigid
boundaries between law and politics that preserved the Court's
legitimacy in earlier times are loosened." Brest, Levinson, Balkin,
and Amar refer to "academic critiques" of the Court by progressives
and later by legal realists who emphasized the Court's political role
and the political character of its doctrinal analysis and questioned
"the Court's legitimacy as an anti-democratic and anti-majoritarian
institution." Particularly in the period after 1937, "the Supreme
Court itself begins to problematize its role, and the rhetoric of judicial
restraint and the need to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions
become ubiquitous in judicial opinions." 160
This periodization of constitutional history clearly reflects the
modernist anxiety about the practice of judicial review and its
relationship to democracy. As the authors note, this particular form
of anxiety is most prevalent among academic critics of the Supreme
Court and the Court itself. Lawyers and ordinary judges presumably
share this anxiety only by proxy, as they take it into account in
fashioning arguments that will succeed and writing opinions that will
be upheld.
An alternative periodization of constitutional history has been
reconstructed and redescribed by Ackerman as "the ongoing
constitutional narrative constructed by lawyers and judges. ' 161 This
existing "professional narrative" is also oriented around the familiar
turning points of the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal, but
with a different emphasis (and without the anxiety). The existing
159. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 38 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS].
160. BREST, supra note 158, at 401 n.1.
161. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 159, at 38.
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narrative emphasizes creation, origination, and the departure from
tradition. Of the three periods, the Founding is viewed as the most
radical and decisive break with the past; after all, the ratification
procedures for amending the Articles of Confederation were not
followed, so that the new Constitution was, strictly speaking, illegal.
But this illegality under the preexisting Articles only enhances the
pedigree of the Constitution of 1787. "If this were not the case, the
real Founders of our Republic were the folks who wrote and ratified
the Articles of Confederation. '' 16
Things are different with the constitutional amendments enacted
after the Civil War. "Substantively, everybody recognizes that these
three amendments profoundly transformed preexisting constitutional
principles. ' 163  But if we turn to the process by which the
Reconstruction amendments became part of our higher law, "a
remarkable silence- descends on the legal community."'164 According
to the received professional narrative, the Civil War amendments are
just like any other amendments ratified in accordance with Article
Five of the Constitution; so in that sense they are presumed to be
"procedurally unoriginal. ''165
Finally, when modern lawyers and judges turn to the New Deal,
"they tell themselves a story which denies that anything deeply
creative was going on." 166 Substantively, the New Deal's triumph of
activist national government is viewed as merely a rediscovery and
resurrection of Chief Justice Marshall's original vision of broad
national lawmaking authority. "The period between Reconstruction
and the New Deal can then be viewed as a (complex) story about the
fall from grace-wherein most of the Justices strayed from the path of
righteousness and imposed their laissez-faire philosophy on the
nation through the pretext of constitutional interpretation.1' 67
Procedurally, nothing of constitutional moment was supposed to have
happened at all.
Apparently, We the People have never again engaged in the
sweeping kind of critique and creation attempted by the Founding
Federalists.... [T]his schema suggests a subtle but unmistakable
162. Id. at 42.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 42-43.
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decline in the constitutionally generative capacities of the
American people. 68
So much for the prevailing interpretive schema. "The story line
simply presents itself as an unassailable part of the conventional legal
wisdom, presupposed in countless legal arguments by all sides of the
endless constitutional debate about other, seemingly more
controversial matters. 1 69 And yet, asserts Ackerman, "despite its
familiarity," the existing constitutional narrative is built on sand, in
the sense that it "cannot withstand an encounter with the facts of
American history." Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that this in
no way suggests to Ackerman that the project of constructing a
constitutional narrative should be abandoned. Instead, he proposes
his own "revisionary narrative."'70
This is not the place for a detailed examination of Ackerman's
competing constitutional narrative. Suffice it to say that, in broad
outline, Ackerman's version restores both substantive originality and
procedural creativity to the Reconstruction and New Deal
achievements, which reflect an ongoing American engagement with
higher lawmaking. In the Reconstruction period, the focus is on the
"questionable legality" of the procedures by which the Civil War
amendments were adopted. 7' In the New Deal, the emphasis is on a
mobilized electorate, a president with a mandate for sweeping
change, and a series of "transformative appointments" to the
Supreme Court-all of which had in substance, if not in form, the
effect of amending the Constitution.172  On this reading the
"jurisgenerative" capacities of the later periods rival that of the
Founding and suggest a remarkably adaptive constitutional practice
that has never ceased to embrace unconventional means of
fundamental change.
In effect, then, three substantively different schemas for
interpreting the constitutional past have been considered. For
present purposes, the main point is not so much to decide among
them or others that might be proposed. Rather, the point is that some
such schema, as evidenced by the prevalence and persistence of this
particular interpretive practice, seems necessary if we are to make
168. Id.
169. Id. at 39.
170. Id. at 44.
171. For a more detailed discussion, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 99-119 (1998).
172. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 268-382.
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sense of our constitutional past and put it into meaningful perspective
for the present and the future.
C. The Community-Society Paradigm
In this final Section I introduce a basic interpretive paradigm that
makes sense of judicial decisions in many areas of the law and
provides a basis for reasoned criticism of others. This paradigm,
which has yet to be explicitly recognized in either adjudication or
academic commentary, is based on the distinction between
community and society. A brief review of cases illustrating the
paradigm will provide a fitting summary and example of "law as
interpretation."
First of all, background for the current legal discussion is found
in Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law. For Maine, the transition from
the patriarchal institutions of remote antiquity to the rules and
institutions of modern western European societies could be viewed as
a salutary progression: "[W]e may say that the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract."'173  But in late nineteenth-century Germany, the
displacement of the organic solidarity of inherently valuable
relationships based on likeness and shared life-experience
(Gemeinschaft) by contractual relationships based on monetary value
(Gesellschaft) seemed to epitomize the alienation of mass society.
The controlling book is Ferdinand T6nnies, Community and
Society.17 4 It influenced later thinkers such as Durkheim, Simmel, and
Weber and, after World War I, became a kind of Bible for a new
generation longing for the Golden Age of Gemeinschaft.
By community I understand a relatively small group in which
shared values may be assumed; communities in this sense range in
size from the family to the boy scout troop to the synagogue. By
society I understand a relatively large group in which shared values
cannot be assumed. The imposition of presumptively shared values
that might be appropriate in a community would not normally be
acceptable in society at large. Conversely, the requirement of a
stance of neutrality among presumptively unshared values that might
173. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 174 (1930) (1861); see also
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1958) (analyzing the public and the private
realm).
174. FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY & SOCIETY (GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELL-
SCHAFF) (Charles P. Loomis trans., 1957) (1887).
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be appropriate in society would not normally be acceptable in a
smaller community. These principles are operative in a variety of
legal contexts.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville is usually thought of as the
case in which the Supreme Court's void-for-vagueness doctrine was
definitively established, and indeed many provisions of the
Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance at issue are laughably vague:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or
plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers
or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and
brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly
persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming
houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served,
persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of
their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon
conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for
Class D offenses.175
Within the vagueness, however, there is a sort of subtheme, a
certain slant on the vagueness that Justice Douglas thought he
detected in the selective enforcement of the ordinance. The police
officers picked up racially mixed couples, arrested lower-class
workers walking to and fro on city streets, charged others with
loitering because they were bar-hopping, and another with being a
"common thief" because "he was reputed to be a thief." By contrast,
"unemployed pillars of the community who have married rich wives"
might come within the terms of the ordinance but were not
investigated. Nor were "members of golf clubs and city clubs," even
though they might well be "habitually spending their time by
frequenting... places where alcoholic beverages are sold or
served."176
Justice Douglas encapsulates what was really being criminalized
in the word "lifestyle," a popular term in the 1970s. What "[tihose
generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance-poor
people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers" have really run afoul of is
"the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the
courts.' 1 77 In other words, a standard that might be appropriate at the
175. 405 U.S. 156, 156-57 n.1 (1972).
176. Id. at 163-64.
177. Id. at 170; cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the
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community level (something like "Thou shalt not be a low-life") is
inappropriately generalized at the societal level.
City of Chicago v. Wilson is a factually dissimilar but structurally
related case from the 1970s in which the term "lifestyle" is also
prominently employed. Defendants, male transvestites, were arrested
pursuant to the following ordinance:
Any person who shall appear in a public place ... in a dress not
belonging to his or her sex, with intent to conceal his or her
sex.., shall be fined not less than twenty dollars nor more than five
hundred dollars for each offense.178
The city asserted four reasons for its ban on cross-dressing, only one
of which had any plausibility: "to prevent inherently antisocial
conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our society. 1 79
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that it had "long recognized
restrictions on the State's power to regulate matters pertinent to one's
choice of a life-style which has not been demonstrated to be harmful
to society's health, safety or welfare." 18  As for the city's implied
concern about public morals, the court translated this into a mere
aesthetic preference: "[T]he city has not articulated the manner in
which the ordinance is designed to protect the public morals. It is
presumably believed that cross-dressing in public is offensive to the
general public's aesthetic preference.' 18' While a ban by their parents
on defendants' cross-dressing as minors would presumably be legally
unassailable, the city's error was to elevate and inappropriately
generalize that unassailable communal norm to the societal level.
The Skokie cases present the agonized efforts of an actual
"community" to free itself of offensive speech. 182  The village of
Skokie had a population of about 70,000 persons, of whom
approximately 40,000 persons were of "Jewish religion or Jewish
ancestry," including 5,000 to 7,000 survivors of German concentration
camps. The National Socialist Party of America wanted to
demonstrate in front of the village hall wearing storm trooper
Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers and the Like, 3 CRIM. L.
BULL. 205, 226 (1967) ("[I]f some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and
no more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but a court thinks
this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise his sights or go to jail as a
vagrant.").
178. 389 N.E.2d 522, 523 (Ill. 1978).
179. Id. at 524.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 525.
182. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 23-35 (1986).
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uniforms of the German Nazi Party embellished with the Nazi
swastika.
The state court conceded that "the sight of [the swastika] is
abhorrent to the Jewish citizens of Skokie, and that the survivors of
the Nazi persecutions, tormented by their recollections, may have
strong feelings regarding its display.1' 8 3 Likewise, the federal court
acknowledged that "the proposed demonstration would seriously
disturb, emotionally and mentally, at least some, and probably many
of the Village's residents." 184 Nevertheless, neither court accepted the
village's arguments; and both courts quoted the following language
from Cohen v. California:
"[W]e are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and
subject to objectionable speech." The ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority
would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply
as a matter of personal predilections. 85
Personal predilections are a perfectly fine basis for banning
offensive speech in the home (as the "captive audience" doctrine
holds) or more generally in the "community," as I have defined that
term. But Cohen stands for the proposition that a courthouse
corridor is not a community in this sense. And the Skokie cases stand
for the proposition that a village is not a community either. As the
federal court put it, the village was "attempt[ing], by fiat, to declare
the entire Village, at all times, a privacy zone that may be sanitized
from the offensiveness of Nazi ideology and symbols.' ' 8 6 Instead, the
village should be viewed as open to the larger world, as a window on
society, where a standard of tolerance is enforced as a matter of law.
Cohen v. California is perhaps best known for Justice Harlan's
famous statement that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric," which
Robert Bork has seen as "the basis for the decision" and the cri de
coeur of "moral relativism or the privatization of morality."'1 87 But no
less stolid a jurist as Chief Justice Rehnquist has weighed in with
similar sentiments in the case of Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell:
"'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an
183. Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. 1978).
184. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978).
185. 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (citations omitted).
186. 578 F.2d at 1207.
187. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 246-49 (1990).
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inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of the dislike of a particular expression."18
A different objection is made by Professor Robert Post, to whom
the Hustler Court's reasoning seems "deeply misplaced in the context
of a tort that appeals to intersubjective, rather than to private,
standards of judgment.1 89  The tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress involves behavior that violates "community values,
rather than merely personal or idiosyncratic preferences."'190 Thus,
what is really at issue in Hustler is not the "subjectiveness" of the
outrageousness standard, "but rather that it is constitutionally
inappropriate as a standard for the legal regulation of public
discourse."1 91 To allow any particular community to enforce its
commonly accepted norms would be to privilege one community over
others; in other words, it would make the communal norm
enforceable in society generally. As Professor Post usefully suggests,
we should conceive the neutrality required of societal standards not
"only at the level of ideas, [but] at the more general level of the
structures that establish communal life." We might then say that "the
concept of public discourse requires the state to remain neutral in the
'marketplace of communities.' '1 92
In obscenity law, whether expression is "prurient" or "patently
offensive" is determined by applying "contemporary community
standards," so that the privileging of one community over another
might seem to be avoided.'93 However, the Supreme Court has also
made clear that for purposes of determining "contemporary
community standards" the entire State of California can serve as the
relevant "community," which of course defeats the purpose
altogether. It is no protection at all for the many communities within
the State of California to say that the standard of "their" state is
being used, instead of, Say, Florida's. So the claim that the standard is
somehow individualized to one's community is meaningless.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the Court declared that "[t]he
States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public
188. 485 U.S. 46,55 (1988).
189. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601,625 (1990).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 625-26.
192. Id. at 632.
193. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a
tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public
safety, or to jeopardize.., the States' 'right... to maintain a decent
society." ' 194 But consider what can be taken into account in making
that "morally neutral" judgment:
It concerns the tone of the society, the mode, or to use terms that
have perhaps greater currency, the style and quality of life .... [I]f
[a man] demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants
in the market, and to foregather in public places-discreet, if you
will, but accessible to all-with others who share his tastes, then to
grant him his right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to
impinge on other privacies. Even supposing that each of us can, if
he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in
truth, we cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and
done intrudes upon us all, want it or not.195
In Cohen v. California we were supposed to avert our eyes to
avoid further bombardment of our sensibilities. But even that would
be unnecessary in the Paris Adult Theatre case, which involved a
theater open only to adults and emblazoned with elaborate warnings
as to the "adult" material inside. Apparently, we need to be
protected from the mere knowledge that someone, somewhere, is
watching an obscene film. So Paris is not really a case about anything
taking place in the market or in public places. But even if it were
such a case, of course, the societal judgment should not turn on a
particular community's preferred style and quality of life or on
whether one shares its tastes.
Religion cases offer a rich field for studying the community-
society paradigm and can only be briefly summarized here. The basic
conflict is perhaps best presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder.96  The
Amish community argued that their children's attendance at high
school, public or private, was "contrary to the Amish religion and way
of life," which requires "life in a church community separate and
apart from the world and worldly influence." The state argued with
equal plausibility for the power to impose "reasonable regulations for
the control and duration of basic education." In this case an
exception was simply made for the Amish, in view of their sharply
defined and apparently exemplary "community" values. Even so,
Justice Douglas worried in dissent about foreclosing important
194. 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 59 (quoting Alexander Bickel, On Pornography: Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion, 22 PUB. INT. 25-26 (Winter 1971) (emphasis added by the Court)).
196. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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options in life from the Amish children. The community can exercise
coercive power over its members too, as it demands that they
conform to its ways.
These issues are raised in a family context in Walker v. Superior
Court, which held that community values must yield to the state's
interest in protecting minor children's life and health.197 Mrs. Walker,
a Christian Scientist, had treated her seriously ill, four-year-old
daughter with prayer rather than medical care, in accordance with her
religious beliefs. 198 After seventeen days the child died of meningitis.
The California Supreme Court was unmoved by the argument that
not all children treated in this way die, and that not all children given
medical treatment survive. "The expression of legislative intent is
clear," ruled the court; "when a child's health is seriously jeopardized,
the right of a parent to rely exclusively on prayer must yield."'199 As to
Walker's constitutional defense, the court was even less moved by the
community claim: "[P]arents have no right to free exercise of religion
at the price of a child's life." 200 The court thus found no bar to the
prosecution of Mrs. Walker for involuntary manslaughter and felony
child endangerment.
Numerous other cases could be cited in which the theme of
community vs. society is presented. 201 The common conflict is the
community's claim of freedom and individuality, balanced against
society's competing demand for coercion and uniformity. This
interpretive problem can be seen as an instance of the more general
problem of demarcating the proper boundary between tolerance and
conformity in a legal system applied to large numbers of smaller
communities. Use of the community-society paradigm does not
dictate the outcome in such cases, but it does provide a conceptual
vocabulary in terms of which applicable legal doctrines may be
consistently developed and employed. Thus, the distinction between
community and society merits explicit recognition as a fundamental
interpretive framework in a system of law that develops largely
through interpretive practices and the use of basic interpretive
paradigms.
197. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
198. See CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MATERIALS (1990).
199. Walker, 763 P.2d at 867.
200. Id. at 870.
201. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 527 (1993); Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261 (Cal.
1998).
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